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COURTHOUSES VS. STATEHOUSES?
William S. Koski*
SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS. By Eric A.

Hanushek & Alfred A. Lindseth. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press. 2009. Pp. xviii, 411. $29.95.
& KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE
COURTS. By Michael A. Rebell. Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press. 2009. Pp. xiii, 192. $35.
COURTS

INTRODUCTION (OR, THE HYPE)
Just over twenty years ago, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared the
commonwealth's primary and secondary public-education finance systemindeed, the entire system of primary and secondary public education in Kentucky-unconstitutional under the "common schools" clause of the
education article in Kentucky's constitution.' That case has been widely
cited as having ushered in the "adequacy" movement in school-finance litigation and reform, in which those challenging state school-funding schemes
argue that the state has failed to ensure that students are provided an adequate education guaranteed by their state constitutions. Since the Rose
decision in Kentucky, some thirty-three school-finance lawsuits have
reached final decisions in thirty-one states.! For plaintiffs, the campaign has
been relatively successful in court, as school-funding schemes in twenty-two
*
Eric & Nancy Wright Professor of Clinical Education and Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School; Professor of Education (by courtesy), Stanford University School of Education. I am
grateful to Michael Rebell, Rick Hanushek, and Al Lindseth for their thoughtful comments and
sporting willingness to review this Review. Also, a disclaimer: I am hardly an innocent observer in
the public-education-reform debates, as I currently serve as co-counsel for more than sixty
school-children and their families who are plaintiffs in the recently filed Robles-Wong v. Cahfornia
school-finance litigation in which the plaintiff coalition-which also includes nine California school
districts, the California School Boards Association, the Association of California School Administrators, and the California Congress of Parents, Teachers, and Students-is asking the court to
declare unconstitutional the state's public-education finance system.
1.

Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

2. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 108-09 (1995) (stating that certain arguments assert that, given the
existing school-financing structure, the state has not satisfied its obligation to provide for a system
of public schools); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219,
219-22, 235-36 (1990) (discussing Rose and its implications for future finance reform litigation).
3. See Education Adequacy Liability Decisions Since 1989, NAT'L AcCEss NETWORK (June
2010), http://www.schoolfunding.info (follow "LITIGATION" hyperlink; then follow "School
Funding 'Adequacy' Decisions by Outcome" hyperlink).

923

924

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:923

states have been declared unconstitutional. 4 Recently, however, a few courts
seem to be taking a more cautious approach, either declining to become embroiled in school-finance lawsuits or declaring the school-finance systems
constitutional and relinquishing jurisdiction.! Yet the pace of litigation appears unabated. In light of the overall success of the adequacy movement in
court, the wariness with which some courts have begun to approach the matter, and the continued press for school reform through the courts, it is fair to
say that the adequacy-finance-litigation movement has matured and it is
time to take stock of it. Two recent books-Eric Hanushek and Al Lindseth's Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses7 and Michael Rebell's
Courts & Kids'-do just that. And they reach very different conclusions (at
least on the face of it).
If one were to stage a bout between contenders for the school-financereform-litigation heavyweight championship, it would be nearly impossible
to find a better match than Rebell vs. Hanushek and Lindseth.9 In the plaintiffs' corner and fighting for an appropriate role for the courts is Michael
Rebell. A professor at Columbia University's Teachers College, Rebell is a
battle-tested veteran of school reform litigation, having sued the New York
Public Schools in the 1980s for its failure to ensure that children with dis-

4.

Id.

5. See, e.g., Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (declaring the
state's reformed educational-finance-and-service-delivery system constitutional some twelve years
after striking the old system down); Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State, 158 P.3d 1058 (Okla. 2007) (refusing to intervene on separation-of-powers and nonjusticiability grounds and finding that educationalfinance policy is reserved for the Oklahoma legislature); see also John Dinan, School Finance
Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE 96, 96 (Joshua M.
Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009) ("Numerous state court rulings of the past several years indicate, however, that the school-finance-litigation movement may have peaked, in that many judges
are now disinclined to undertake continuing supervision of school finance policies."); Forum: Many
Schools are Still Inadequate: Now What?, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2009, at 39, 41 (reporting Hanushek
and Lindseth as stating that, while "judicial remedies have played a significant role in school finance
in the past, that era is drawing to a close"). While there can be no doubt that the pace of plaintiff
victories in educational-finance litigation has slowed in the last four years or so, it may be too early
to discern any long-term trend in judicial willingness to participate in educational-finance litigation
and is certainly too early to declare the demise of adequacy litigation. Indeed, as Rebell has argued,
the judiciary may be in a period of cautious reflection in which it is contemplating what effective
role it may play in reforming failing schools and school systems. Forum: Many Schools are Still
Inadequate: Now What?, supra, at 44.
6. Currently, there are eight educational-finance-reform cases pending in the state courts.
Education Adequacy Liability Decisions Since 1989, supra note 3.
7. Eric A. Hanushek is the Paul and Jean Hanna Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution of
Stanford University. Alfred A. Lindseth is of counsel at the Atlanta-based law firm Sutherland Asbill
& Brennan LLP.
8. Michael A. Rebell is the Executive Director of the Campaign for Educational Equity at
Teachers College, Columbia University, and Professor of Law and Educational Practice at Columbia
Law School.
9. I hasten to note that the authors did not write their books for the specific purpose of
debating each other. Thus, the prizefight metaphor may be an imperfect fit. That said, the authors
frequently discuss each other's work, and the issues they address are remarkably aligned, so I'm
going with the metaphor (apologies to those who disfavor sports metaphors).
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abilities had access to an appropriate educationo and, more recently, having
successfully challenged New York's failure to provide a sound, basic
education to the children of low-income communities in the state (Rebell,
pp. xii-xiii). Outside of the courtroom, Rebell has advanced the adequacy
movement by developing his theory of "public engagement" in the education-reform process (Rebell, pp. 97-103), studying the role of courts in
institutional (school) reform," and establishing a network of researchers,
policy-thinkers, and lawyers to collaborate in advocating school-finance
reform.12
In Courts & Kids, Rebell makes the case for the authority and responsibility of the courts to protect the constitutional rights of children who have
been denied a sound, basic education. Rebell believes not only that it is incumbent upon state supreme courts to recognize and enforce the educational
rights of children (Rebell, Chapter Two), but also that courts in educationalfinance litigations have been effective in enhancing equality of educational
opportunity for all children (Rebell, Chapter Three). Looking to the future
of judicial involvement in educational policy, however, Rebell proposes a
nuanced model-what he calls the "successful remedies" model (Rebell, p.
57)-of judicial engagement that establishes a "functional separation of
powers" among the three branches of government, "in which the judicial,
legislative, and executive branches working together can deal effectively
with difficult social policy issues like providing a meaningful educational
opportunity for all children" (Rebell, p. 7).
In the defendants' (read: states') corner and fighting against court intervention in matters of school finance are Eric Hanushek and Al Lindseth.
Hanushek is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University
and is widely regarded as a leading figure in the study of the economics of
education." Perhaps more salient, Hanushek has testified on behalf of state
defendants in numerous educational-finance-reform litigations.14 Hanushek
is a leading proponent of performance-based school funding and accountability and is known for his position that "differences in either the absolute
[public education] spending level or spending increases bear little or no
10. Rebell, p. xii; see also Jose P. v. Ambach, 557 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(listing Rebell as counsel in school reform case).
& ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND
(describing and analyzing the role of courts in educational policymaking);
& ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EQUALITY AND EDUCATION (1985) (analyzing the relative effects of judicial, legislative, and executive intervention in educational policy and practice).
11.

See

MICHAEL A. REBELL

THE COURTS (1982)
MICHAEL A. REBELL

12. Rebell was among the founders of both the Campaign for Educational Equity at Teachers
College and the National Access Network, which provides a forum for those interested in educational equity advocacy. See Michael Rebell to Lead Campaign for Educational Equity at Teachers
College, TEACHERS COLLEGE - COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (June 9, 2005), http://www.tc.columbia.edu/
news/article.htm?id=5 184.
13. Eric Hanushek, HOOVER
Nov. 21, 2010).

INSTITUTION,

http://www.hoover.org/fellows/10150 (last visited

14. See Court Testimony, ERIC A. HANUSHEK, http://edpro.stanford.edu (follow "Experience" hyperlink; then follow "Court Testimony" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (listing cases
in which Hanushek has testified).
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consistent relationship to differences in student achievement" (Hanushek &
Lindseth, p. 54). Lindseth, a partner with the Atlanta-based law firm Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, has represented states in school-finance lawsuits in
various states, including New York, Florida, and North Dakota, and over the
last twenty-five years has advised governors, elected officials, and state education leaders on topics related to school finance and reform (Hanushek &
Lindseth, p. xv).
Although the two books were not explicitly written to debate each other,
Hanushek and Lindseth's Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses of-

fers the counterpunch to Rebell's optimism regarding judicial intervention in
matters educational. Hanushek and Lindseth start with the dual arguments
that public education in the United States, on measures ranging from global
competitiveness to a yawning achievement gap, "faces real problems" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 23) and that "increased spending [on public
education] has yielded little in terms of improved student achievement"
(Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 50). They then focus their ire on the courts, who
they argue have overreached and assumed an "all-encompassing" (Hanushek
& Lindseth, p. 83), constitutionally inappropriate (Hanushek & Lindseth, p.
84), and institutionally ineffective (Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 118-70) role
in educational policymaking. And they reserve some criticism for the methodologies used by expert consultants in designing and "costing out"
educational-finance reforms, arguing that such methods only "give the illusion of providing valid, useful, and reliable information."" Rather than the
continued press for reform through the courts or the use of scientifically
suspect costing-out studies to drive school-finance reform, Hanushek and
Lindseth propose a "performance-based" school-funding model that directly
links funding to improved student performance (Hanushek & Lindseth,
Chapter Eight).
But the authors do not disagree on everything. In Part I of this Review, I
identify those areas of educational-finance policy and reform in which the
authors are in agreement. Part II highlights the authors' areas of difference
and critiques the arguments they advance for their respective causes. In Part
IH I explore two areas-Hanushek and Lindseth's substantive school reform
proposals and Rebell's institutional choice and process arguments-in
which the authors appear to be talking past each other, though not incompatibly.
Part IV concludes by proposing a new grand bargain that recognizes the
authors' convergence over several key issues, agrees to disagree on one or
two issues, and calls for reasonable concession on both sides. Is it possible
that these longtime partisans could find common ground in the educationalfinance-and-policy-reform discussions and move forward? Could we ever
call this fight a draw?
15. Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 178; see also Eric A. Hanushek, Science Violated: Spending
Projections and the "Costing Out" of an Adequate Education, in COURTING FAILURE: How
SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITs EXPLoIT JUDGES' GOOD INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN 257
(Eric A. Hanushek ed., 2006) [hereinafter COURTING FAILURE].
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OF AGREEMENT (OR, THE GLOVE TAP)

Let there be no doubt that the authors share one common value: all have
a bona fide concern about the achievement of American students and the
importance of that achievement both to the success and well-being of the
individual and to the economic progress of the nation, the functioning of our
civic institutions, and the continued cohesion of our society. Hanushek and
Lindseth's focus on the economic well-being of citizens and the nation
couldn't be more clear: "A good education has always been the key to enabling even the poorest of our citizens to achieve the American Dream," and
the quality of a person's education "has an impact on the whole of society,
affecting not only the standard of living enjoyed by our citizens, but also the
fairness of our economic and social systems" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 10).
Perhaps more surprising is the authors' agreement that it is not only the absolute achievement of American students that matters, but also the relative
achievement of subgroups of children: as Hanushek and Lindseth put it, "[a]
major problem facing the nation is the significant achievement gap between
middle-class and white children on the one hand and poor and minority
children on the other" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 10).
Emblematic of the maturation of school-finance litigation and research,
the authors also appear to agree that "money matters," so long as it is spent
efficiently on the appropriate resources. For years, a standard state defense
against constitutional challenges to their school-finance systems and a routine subject of judicial inquiry was that plaintiffs could not prove causation
because there was no evidence that educational spending affected student
achievement. While it appears that the cost-quality debate has been settled
in the broadest sense-few would seriously contend that educational resources have no effect on student outcomes-the debate has shifted to the
more nuanced questions of which educational resources affect student attainment and achievement and how we can design a school-finance system
that ensures the efficient use of funds."
Further evidence of the coming-of-age of school-finance policy research
and advocacy is the agreement among the camps that additional educational
resources must be allocated to students of greater need and that schoolfinance formulas should account for those needs. While Rebell has long
been a proponent of so-called "vertical equity" in school funding (i.e., ensuring that differently situated students receive different funding based on
16. Rebell notes that "[tihe courts have also grappled extensively with the question of
whether money matters in education." Rebell, p. 34. He goes on to state that twenty-nine of the
thirty state supreme court cases that directly considered the issue of whether money matters either
explicitly or implicitly found that "funding affects educational opportunity and achievement"
Rebell, p. 34.
17. The authors appear to differ on the degree of policy reform necessary to ensure better use
of funding. While Hanushek and Lindseth advocate for a comprehensive package of interlocking
policy reforms that would aim to ensure that funding be tied to performance and thereby increase
efficient spending, Rebell does not believe that Hanushek and Lindseth's fundamental reform package would ever be adopted and accordingly would not hold funding reform hostage to the passage of
that package.
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their greater need), Hanushek and Lindseth also propose a "needs-adjusted
base funding" system (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 253) that "link[s] funding
to individual students, with extra funding provided based on environmental
factors" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 251), including the needs of "students
with special needs, with economic disadvantages, and with language deficits."" This is no small point of convergence, because current funding
systems may provide earmarked, categorical funding to support diverse
learning needs. As Hanushek and Lindseth note, however, "[c]ategorical
funding sometimes relates to individual needs .. . but more often relates to

specific uses of funds, such as smaller class sizes, the use of guidance counselors, or the purchase of new textbooks" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 253).
Put simply, a needs-based base-funding system would better target those
students requiring additional resources, while providing added spending
flexibility to local school administrators. Of course, thorny issues concerning which needs should be recognized and how much those needs should
affect the base-funding formula remain, but the agreement to recognize student needs is a significant achievement.
Beyond the consensus that money well spent matters, equally noteworthy is the apparent agreement that money alone may not be enough. Over
the past decade or so, a good deal of Hanushek's educational-policy work
has concentrated on outcomes-based, performance-based state and district
policies that reward teachers and administrators for improving student
achievement and attaimnent, while sanctioning those who fail.' 9 Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses is the summation of that work and

calls for a comprehensive performance-based funding scheme that goes far
beyond funding to outcomes-based assessment and accountability for
performance coupled with greater parental and local administrative
decision-making autonomy and flexibility (Hanushek & Lindseth, Chapter
Eight). In many respects, contemporary educational policymaking has been
sympathetic to Hanushek's vision. The standards-based reform movement,
which calls for the establishment of outcomes-based educational content
standards for what all children should know and be able to do in certain core
subject areas, the alignment of assessments and performance reporting to
those standards, and the further alignment of curriculum, teacher training,

18. Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 254. More succinctly, they acknowledge that "[s]chool funding
policies must recognize the underlying heterogeneity of students and their educational challenges
and ensure that all schools have the means to succeed." Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 218.
19. See EIc A. HANUSHEK WITH CHARLES S. BENSON ET AL., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK
(1994) (describing and recommending a performance-based system for school reorganization); Eric
A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, Sorting Out Accountability Systems, in SCHOOL AccouNTABILITY 75 (Williamson M. Evers & Herbert J. Walberg eds., 2002) (arguing for a system of school
accountability); Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, Does School Accountability Lead to
Improved Student Performance?, 24 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297 (2005); Eric A. Hanushek,
Outcomes, Incentives, and Beliefs: Reflections on Analysis of the Economics of Schools, 19 EDUC.
EVALUATION & PoL'Y ANALYSIS 301 (1997) (highlighting key aspects of educational policy analysis); Eric A. Hanushek, Applying PerformanceIncentives to Schoolsfor DisadvantagedPopulations,
29 EDuc. & URB. Soc'Y 296 (1997) (suggesting a performance-based system for the reorganization
of schools).
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and professional development and other educational policies with the standards, has taken hold of all state capitals.20 With the addition of
accountability systems, such as those developed to satisfy the federal No
Child Left Behind Act,2 ' school districts, schools, administrators, teachers,
and students are now subject to sanctions (and sometimes rewards) based on
their performance on such standards-based tests. While Hanushek and Lindseth's proposal would go further toward tying funding to performance, there
is no doubt that outcomes-based accountability has become embedded in
educational policy.
Rebell has by no means ignored this development and appears to have
embraced certain aspects of it. His "successful remedies" model for educational reform litigation demands both the establishment of "challenging
academic content and performance standards that define in concrete terms
the content of a sound basic education"22 and the development of "instructional programs and accountability mechanisms that will provide all
students with meaningful educational opportunities" (Rebell, p. 57). Although Rebell appears to advocate for standards, programs, and
accountability, and would require courts to police legislative school reform
efforts to ensure that challenging outcomes standards are established and
effective programs and accountability systems are implemented, he is much
less specific on the policy details, particularly on what he means by "accountability systems," than Hanushek and Lindseth. Rather, Rebell argues
for a process-based system of court-overseen school reform instead of specific substantive educational policies like those Hanushek and Lindseth
propose.
With those broad areas of consensus in hand, let the fight commence
with the obligatory tap of the gloves at center ring.

IMPROVING

EDUCATION
20. See MILBREY W. McLAUGHLIN & LORRIE A. SHEPARD,
THROUGH STANDARDS-BASED REFORM 1-2 (1995); Jennifer A. O'Day & Marshall S. Smith, Systemic Reform and Educational Opportunity, in DESIGNING COHERENT EDUCATION POLICY:

250, 270 (Susan H. Fuhrman ed., 1993) (describing standards-based reform
as "[t]he approach most often suggested" to the problem of inequitable distribution of educational
resources).
IMPROVING THE SYSTEM

21. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578).
22. Rebell, p. 57. Indeed, Rebell argues that "new state standards [have] provided the courts
with practical tools for developing judicially manageable approaches for dealing with complex
educational issues" and have "provided judges with workable criteria for crafting practical remedies
in these litigations." Rebell, p. 20. It should be noted that the extent to which state content standards
have influenced judicial decision making has been debated. See James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing,
and School Finance Litigation, 86 Thx. L. REv. 1223, 1224 (2008) ("[Tlhe nascent conventional
wisdom about the relationship between standards and school finance litigation is wrong not just
once but twice.").
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OF DISAGREEMENT (OR, THE FIGHT)

Right at the bell the fighters come out swinging.2 The authors disagree
vehemently on whether the judiciary has a legitimate and effective role to
play in the reform of public schooling. In this Part, I will first assess the
competing positions regarding judicial intervention in educational policymaking and then consider the disagreement on the extent to which current
educational research can and should guide the inquiry on educational reform.
A. The Courts, the Legislatures, and School Reform

In the wake of the so-called "third wave" of school-finance litigation and
the success of the adequacy argument in state supreme courts, the once
white-hot debate over "judicial activism" in educational policymaking and
practice (think desegregation litigation) has rekindled. In the last four years
alone at least five full volumes have been published on the subject,24 most of
which are skeptical, if not highly critical, of court intervention. Courts &
23. Witness this testy-though respectful-exchange in the journal Education Next. In response to Rebell's critique of their performance-based funding proposal, Hanushek and Lindseth
assert that "[n]otwithstanding his obfuscation, Michael Rebell's solution is essentially more of the
same," while Rebell replies to Hanushek and Lindseth with the following: "If I didn't know that
Rick Hanushek was an outstanding economist and that Al Lindseth was a master litigator, I would
think from some of the provocative phrases they use in their writings that they were sensationalist
journalists, looking to attract readers with shocking but misleading headlines and catchphrases."
Forum: Many Schools are Still Inadequate:Now What?, supra note 5, at 46.
24. FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE, supra note 5; COURTING FAILURE, supra note
15; SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007); and the two works
discussed in this Review.

For earlier critiques of judicial intervention in educational policy making, see DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAw (1995); RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977);
LINo A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND SCHOOLS

(1976); Nathan Glazer, Towards an Imperialist Judiciary?,41 PUB. INT. 104 (1975).
More recently, Professors William Simon, James Liebman, and Charles Sabel have developed
a theory of democratic governance, which they dub "democratic experimentalism," in which the
judiciary may play the role of first destabilizing the institutional status quo (that has not served the
needs and interests of disadvantaged children) and then working toward reform through ongoing
stakeholder negotiation, evolving measures of performance that address dynamic conditions on the

ground, and transparency to the stakeholders and the public. See James S. Liebman & Charles F.
Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance
and Legal Reform, 28 N.YU. Rev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183, 207, 278-83 (2003); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv.
1015, 1016-28, 1098 (2004); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998) (discussing the theory of democratic
experimentalism in the context of schools); Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the

Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 523
(2009) (setting forth Quality Service Review as an experimentalist solution to child welfare administration). To date, although the literature surrounding the judicial role in experimentalist governance
is modest, it has drawn significant criticism in David A. Super, LaboratoriesofDestitution: Democ-

ratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (2008). For a
recent discussion of judicial experimentalism in educational policymaking, see William S. Koski,

The Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform Twenty Years After Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 789 (20092010). But see R. Craig Wood, Justiciability,Adequacy, Advocacy, and the "American Dream", 98
KY. L.J. 739 (2009-2010).
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Kids vs. Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses could serve as closing

arguments in that rekindled debate. While Rebell recognizes that courts
alone cannot produce meaningful educational reform (Rebell, p. 88), he
nonetheless calls for a robust role for the courts in educational policymaking-a "functional" separation-of-powers model that recognizes and
capitalizes on the relative institutional strengths of the three branches of
government (Rebell, Chapters Four & Five). Citing "the courts' principled
approach to issues and their long-term staying power" (Rebell, p. 55), as
well as their "inherent constitutional responsibilities" (Rebell, p. 57), Rebell
calls for a judicial role in ensuring the development and implementation of
educational reform measures (Rebell, p. 57). In contrast, while Hanushek
and Lindseth don't completely reject any role for the courts,2 5 they argue for
a bare minimalist approach: "[I]f the court abuses its power and intrudes in
areas reserved to the other branches, there is no 'check' within the constitution itself to bring the courts back into the fold. ... Therefore, the potential
of judicial 'tyranny' from adequacy suits is very real .. . ." (Hanushek &
Lindseth, p. 99).
As for who won this judicial activism debate, it depends on what one
means by "winning." Without settling the matter, this Section analyzes the
authors' respective arguments by testing them against four (sometimes overlapping) objections to judicial intervention in social policymaking: (1)
separation of powers requires courts to defer to the political branches in
educational policymaking; (2) conceptual indeterminacy dooms efforts of
courts to intervene in educational policymaking; (3) courts lack the institutional capacity to design and implement effective school reform; and (4)
judicial intervention has not been successful as an empirical matter.
1. The Separation-of-PowersObjection

As the authors all note, a number of courts in the past two decades have
declined to review the merits of plaintiffs' claims that their states' school
funding schemes are unconstitutional under separation-of-powers principles
or the political question doctrine.26 Hanushek and Lindseth do not discuss
the extensive scholarly treatments of the countermajoritarian dilemma, opting instead to simply quote Hamilton's Federalist No. 78 for the abstract

principle that the judiciary possesses neither the power of "the sword [n]or

25. Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 285-87. Hanushek and Lindseth recognize that courts "could
empower legislators to address politically sensitive problems that otherwise would likely remain as
obstacles to effective school reform," Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 285, and that courts possess relative
strengths in evidence gathering, but the authors would have that function focused on making specific
findings of mismanagement, waste, inefficiency, and other harmful external influences when declaring a state's educational system unconstitutional, Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 285-86. Having done
that, "the court's work is complete, and the fashioning of an appropriate remedy is for the legislative
and executive branches." Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 287.
26. Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 100-05; Rebell, pp. 22-24. Rebell counts seven states that
dismissed cases on separation of powers, political question, or judicial manageability grounds. Rebell, pp. 22-23.
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the purse."2 For that reason, their theoretical argument against court involvement seems thin, particularly compared to Rebell's more robust
treatment of the subject. Rebell grounds his argument in favor of court intervention in a critique of the doctrinal underpinnings of the political
question doctrine (Rebell, pp. 23-25) and, relying on John Hart Ely's famous case for judicial review,28 a relatively robust theoretical case for the
judiciary's authority and obligation to enforce positive state constitutional
rights, such as the right to a "sound basic education" and to "correct malfunctions of the political process" where minority rights are compromised at
the hands of electoral majorities (Rebell, pp. 50-52). To the extent that the
primary objection to judicial intervention in educational policymaking is
one of political theory and legal doctrine, Rebell would have the better of
the matter, but that is hardly the authors' only concern about the courts.
2. The StandardsObjection

Rebell contends that courts, which must interpret constitutional terms
such as "adequate" or "sound basic" education in their states' education articles, are capable of applying these concepts in school reform litigations
(Rebell, pp. 17-18). Others, like Hanushek and Lindseth, counter that such
language provides courts with no clear principles or standards to guide the
development of school reform policies.29 As Frank Michelman famously
argued, such conceptual indeterminacy can stymie judicial intervention
because reform proceeds without coherence or clear objectives.30 Indeed the
quest for a unified theory of equality of educational opportunity has bedeviled scholars, judges, and lawyers since the inception of equity-finance-

27. See Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 97 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 412 (Alexander
Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005)).
28.

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).

29. Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 118-28. For a discussion of the courts' deployment of constitutional language in education finance reform cases, see William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and
Institutional Constraints:A Re-examination of the JurisprudentialHistory of Educational Finance
Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1185 (2003).
30. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969). John Coons wrote:
The standards problem is essentially one of achieving intelligibility. If the present state financing systems are condemned, it is not enough simply to declare them invalid. If the court hopes
to generate the consensus necessary to meaningful change it must identify with reasonable
clarity the locus and nature of the constitutional defect. Society cannot or will not respond to
canons incapable of communication.... Unless the court can find an effable essence, its
judgments tend to be ad hoc and unpredictable, qualities which in the school finance case will
evoke nothing but criticism of the court and evasion by the legislatures.
JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 290-91 (1970); see also Martin

R. West & Joshua M. Dunn, The Supreme Courtas School Board Revisited, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE
TO COURTHOUSE, supra note 5, at 15 ("And when courts do engage in policymaking, they should
strive to contain the pernicious effects of litigation by offering clear standards that minimize legal
uncertainty.").
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reform litigation through to the modem adequacy movement." In response
to this "standards objection," neither book attempts a comprehensive theory
of educational opportunity; rather, both look at the same guideposts for reform and draw different conclusions.
Hanushek and Lindseth argue that the complex educational research,
policy, and practice questions that must be answered to come up with an
operational definition of "adequacy" doom the entire judicial educationalpolicymaking enterprise (Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 118-28). What are the
appropriate educational outcomes? What educational resources are correlated with educational outcomes? How much of those resources is enough?
None of these is answerable with any degree of certainty, they argue. Consequently, courts cannot and should not be involved in dictating a standard
for adequacy. Not to worry, responds Rebell: legislatively authorized state
content standards "put into focus the fundamental goals and purposes of our
system of public education" (Rebell, p. 20), and those standards provide
courts with the politically recognized specific expectations and outcomes
measures needed to develop appropriate remedies in school reform cases
(Rebell, p. 59). But those standards are frequently mere aspirations (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 119), are not intended to guide constitutional decision
making (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 120), and cannot be reliably linked with
specific educational resources to be of any remedial guidance,32 Hanushek
and Lindseth reply.
So, this standards debate ultimately resolves itself into a debate over
whether legislatively mandated standards for what all children should know
and be able to do can, as a matter of judicial command, reliably guide educational-resource distribution. In Chapter Seven of their book, Hanushek
and Lindseth unequivocally say "no," while Rebell argues that in the complex world of educational governance and policy, it is appropriate for courts
to use those standards as guideposts for continuous improvement, even if
scientific certainty is elusive. More on this in a moment.
3. The JudicialCapacity Objection

Hanushek and Lindseth argue that, as institutions and decision-making
bodies, courts have neither the expertise nor the capacity to design and implement effective remedies for educational failure. Building on their
argument that there are no workable standards for judicial remedies, they
forcefully argue that the courts therefore tend toward "spending remedies
31. See COONS ET AL., supra note 30 (proposing a scheme to equalize educational quality
between children of disparate socioeconomic backgrounds); ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS POOR
SCHOOLS (1968) (considering whether states offering uneven educational opportunities systemwide
violate the Equal Protection Clause); David L. Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection,
38 HARv. EDUC. REV. 635 (1968) (arguing that states are constitutionally obliged to ensure children
equal educational outcomes); William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat
From Equity in EducationalLaw and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545 (2006) (claiming equality, not adequacy, should be the goal of educational policy).
32. See Hanushek & Lindseth, chapter 7 (concluding that the cost and methods required to
make education adequate are unknown).
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because they believe they will work and because they are the easiest to monitor and enforce" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 138). They go on to criticize
generalist judges for their lack of educational-policy expertise, their limited
access to information in a trial setting, and their reliance on distorted adversarial evidentiary presentations to develop remedies (though some of those
presentations are hardly adversarial, Hanushek and Lindseth point out quite
sagely; instead, they are wink-and-nod agreements to plunder the state treasury) (Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 139-41).
Rebell meets this objection head-on in two different ways. He first
points out that modem courts have developed processes and organizations to
both formulate and administer complex reform decrees (Rebell, pp. 9-14).
Courts have become adept at sifting through complex and contradictory social science evidence. Indeed, given the access to information parties enjoy
during the discovery phase, two scholars have argued that judicial investigation into complex educational-finance issues may, at times, exceed the
investigations of researchers." Although Rebell does not specifically mention it, I note that even after the remedial decree is handed down (whether
by consent or judicial fiat), courts employ numerous administrative structures to monitor and enforce their remedial schemes. These include
monitoring committees that may be composed of party representatives,
magistrates, and masters, who may be charged with resolving disputes or
tweaking remedial schemes; and monitors who evaluate progress toward
compliance with those decrees.
Rebell's second response to the capacity objection is, to be blunt, "compared to what?" This is the heart of his case for a principled and pragmatic
judicial role in educational policymaking and governance-that courts possess unique institutional attributes that make them well suited to making
certain types of educational-policy decisions, particularly when compared to
the legislative and executive branches (Rebell, pp. 48-55). This comparative
institutional analysis reveals that courts have the staying power to pursue
educational reform, a notoriously long and arduous process (Rebell, p. 50).
He further argues that the judiciary's relative political independence makes
it more likely to advance equitable remedies in the face of majoritarian politics. And the courts' rational, analytic, and evidence-based decision-making
method make them well suited to guiding rational, long-range reform efforts. Of course, this process must be done in "colloquy" with the political
branches (Rebell, p. 52), particularly legislatures, which are better suited to
making the delicate tradeoffs on specific policies; and executive agencies,
which are better suited to day-to-day implementation on the ground. "When
disputes arise on whether specific mechanisms are, in fact, meeting constitutional requirements, judicial fact-finding mechanisms should be invoked"
(Rebell, p. 55). In other words, there is a proper judicial role in Rebell's
functional separation-of-powers model of public education reform.

33. See Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin, The Economics ofEducation on Judgment Day,
28 J. EDUC. FIN. 183, 205 (2002) (arguing that courts' rulings may offer direction to researchers).
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Modem public law litigation is far from the ham-handed command-andcontrol model of judicial intervention that was often justly criticized during
the desegregation era.3 4 Courts have learned from that experience and have
developed both the internal administrative mechanisms and a proper awareness of their institutional limitations that permit them to play a productive
role in institutional reform. This is the coming-of-age of school reform litigation in which courts-fulfilling their obligation to ensure that
constitutional values, not merely political and economic expediency, are
considered in educational policymaking-are playing the more modest role
of destabilizing the status quo, reprioritizing the legislative agenda, and providing the political branches with guidance on how to move educational
policy in a more equitable direction. Courts act as catalysts and facilitators
in what then becomes a political process in which the previously disempowered communities and actors find a place at the table. This experimentalistor in Rebell's terms, "functional"-role for the courts is not the outdated
and caricatured image of courts and the judicial process that many court
critics deploy.
Moreover, Hanushek and Lindseth-though hardly overstating the effectiveness of legislative reform 35 -do not fully acknowledge the failures of the
legislative and executive branches in ensuring equal and meaningful educational opportunities for all children. Rather, in claiming the superiority of
the legislative process in developing remedies for school failure, they state
that courts "do not have staff members with educational expertise at their
disposal, in contrast to legislative bodies, which through their various senate
and house committees and their permanent staffs, can draw upon a wide
range of experience and expertise in complex education policy and finance
issues" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 139). Two responses: (1) this, as noted,
fails to recognize the fact-finding capabilities of courts, and (2) it appears to
stylize the actual workings of harried, sometimes part-time state legislators
and their overtaxed staffers. Beyond their staffing argument, and a modest
defense of the legislative school appropriations process, Hanushek and
Lindseth have not made the case that legislatures and executive branches
alone will ensure appropriate educational policies most of the time.
Perhaps equally important, state court judges in many school reform litigations appear to be keenly aware of their comparative institutional
34. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 24 (discussing the evolution of the experimentalist model
of public law litigation from the older idea of bureaucratic judicial intervention). It's also worth
noting that many criticisms of the judiciary's intervention in social policymaking are better aimed at
the federal courts and simply don't apply to either state supreme courts or the different form and
function of state constitutions.
35. In Chapter Three, "The Political Responses," Hanushek and Lindseth describe the uneven success of legislatively driven school reform in the last few decades. Hanushek & Lindseth,
chapter 3.
36. See Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 264-66. One might also question their claim that "[elach
state knows the base cost of operating K- 12 schools from prior budgets." Hanushek & Lindseth, p.
265. In many states, such as California, the legislatures have never made rigorous determinations in
their prior budgets regarding the "base cost" of public education and therefore base current and
irrational budgets on past irrational budgets.
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strengths and know when to stay the course and when to stand aside to allow
the political system to operate. Take, for example, the Massachusetts
litigation. 7 In 1993, the court struck down the commonwealth's school finance system and the legislature responded with a robust set of reforms,
including "large infusions of money into property-poor districts along with
the introduction of rigorous standards, graduation exams, and overall accountability" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 167). This policy reform resulted in
achievement gains, particularly among Hispanic students (Hanushek &
Lindseth, pp. 168-70). In 2005, when the court was again asked to review
the constitutionality of the finance system, it cited the achievement gains,
and refused to intervene. One interpretation of this is that the court found
its proper role in educational-policy reform.
4. The Judicial Ineffectiveness Objection

Twenty years into the adequacy movement and some forty years into
school-finance-reform litigation generally, it is fair to ask whether judicial
involvement works. Here the authors diverge not only on their presentation
and interpretation of evidence, but also on the standard for success.
Following in the tradition of "judicial impact" research in school finance,4 Hanushek and Lindseth analyze observable educational outcomesprimarily fourth grade reading and math and eighth grade math achievement
on the National Assessment of Educational Progress ("NAEP")-in four
states that were subject to judicial decisions striking down the states' respective school-finance systems sufficiently long ago such that any results would
have taken hold (Hanushek & Lindseth, Chapter Six). In three of those four
states-Kentucky, Wyoming, and New Jersey 4 -they show that, from
37. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
38.

Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1138-39.

39. Oddly enough, Hanushek and Lindseth effectively concede the success of judicially
sparked reforms in Massachusetts, Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 168-70, while Rebell laments the
court's failure to stay the course and intervene a second time, Rebell, pp. 78-80.
40. Due to the complexity of establishing appropriate metrics for whether judicial intervention works, the knotty methodological problems in isolating the effects of courts, and the unclear
causal paths through which judicial intervention and the threat of judicial intervention operate, the
literature on judicial impact in educational-policy reform remains largely inconclusive and only
tentatively conclusive in regard to specific outcomes. For an excellent discussion of the researchdesign challenges in examining the nature and effects of judicial intervention in educational-finance
policy, see Bruce D. Baker & Kevin Weiner, School Financeand Courts: Does Reform Matter and
How Can We Tell, 113 TCHRS. C. REC. (forthcoming 2011).
41. New Jersey is the lightning rod for the educational-finance-reform-litigation debate.
Commencing with the Robinson v. Cahill litigation of 1973, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976), through the
Abbott litigation that has consumed the better part of three decades, see, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v.
Burke, I A.3d 602 (N.J. 2006); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v.
Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985), New Jersey has witnessed near-continuous judicial involvement in
educational policymaking and educational finance, with the courts not only calling on the legislature
to reform funding equity and adequacy, but in some instances ordering that specific programmatic
reforms be adopted. Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 109-11, 157-66. Such judicial intervention evokes
strong reactions, ranging from supporters' touting of test-score gains, judicial tenacity, and new
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1992 to 2007, achievement did not grow any faster (and, in some places,
grew slower) than the nation as a whole.42 In Massachusetts, the fourth state,
they acknowledge the quicker pace of growth among white and Hispanic
students, while pointing out the mixed success of African American students
(Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 166-70). While one could quibble with the methodological choices they made, 43 Hanushek and Lindseth are very clear
about their definition of "success" (raised achievement), while applying reasonable methods to available data to determine the extent of success. Their
reliance on student achievement as an outcome measure is also based on the
compelling case they make in Chapters One and Two for the link between
achievement and various important life outcomes for individuals and the
well-being of the nation generally. Even so, demonstrating that judicial intervention in three states did not unequivocally improve NAEP scores in
fourth grade reading and math and eighth grade math cannot be dispositive
on the question of court efficacy. Nor does it address the question whether
litigation or threatened litigation has catalyzed reform in literally dozens of
states-reform that has enhanced and may further enhance educational outcomes.
Rebell, however, in his second chapter-"Defning Success in Sound
Basic Education Litigations"-does not specifically identify how success
should be measured, but rather opts for a process orientation toward defining success. There he first rehashes the treadworn arguments over whether
money matters (Rebell, pp. 30-34). (It does, if well spent.) He then criticizes the sole reliance on test scores as a measure of success (Rebell, pp.
35-37). (Agreed.) Then, as the suspense builds, he stops short of providing a
specific definition of success:
programs for the poor Abbott districts, see Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities,and Priorities:
New Jersey's Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 615, 623
(2004) (describing responses to Abbott decisions), to detractors' belief that "New Jersey is a good
example of the problems inherent in [judiciall remedies" because, "[a]s expected, this financial
effort has led to more resources and programs for the schools but has done little to bring about
higher achievement," Alfred A. Lindseth, The Legal Backdrop to Adequacy, in COURTING FAILURE,
supra note 15, at 63-64.
42. Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 147-66. It should be noted that Rebell implicitly disputes
Hanushek and Lindseth's conclusions regarding the Kentucky and New Jersey litigations and points
to several studies that demonstrate achievement gains in both of those states following implementation of judicial remedies. Rebell, p. 35 & nn.28-30. In addition, Professors Baker and Weiner
employ different methodologies and data to suggest that the courts were more successful in Kentucky and New Jersey than Hanushek and Lindseth posit. Baker & Weiner, supra note 40.
43. For instance: (1) except for Wyoming, they did not account for the effects of actual or
threatened educational-finance litigations or funding increases in other states (which may have
raised the aggregate NAEP scores of other states), other actors that may have influenced achievement within the four states (e.g., other policy choices), and differing characteristics of the states
during the relevant time period; (2) the three test scores-fourth grade math and reading and eighth
grade math-upon which they rely are limited and may not be appropriate measures where finance
reform was targeted at only a subset of the state's students, as was the case in New Jersey; and (3)
they may not have selected the appropriate or sufficient number of years that would reflect the effects of the school-finance judgments. Baker and Welner sharply criticize the methodologies and
findings of Hanushek and Lindseth, arguing that their critique "illustrate[s] that [Hanushek and
Lindseth's] relatively superficial approach is not robust or reliable and that different stories may
easily be told with much the same data." Baker & Weiner, supra note 40, at 25.
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[U]litimately the measure of success for constitutional purposes-and indeed for all purposes-must be whether the state has succeeded in
establishing and maintaining an educational system that provides meaningful educational opportunities to all students and graduates students who
have the knowledge and skills needed to function as capable citizens and
productive workers. And in the end, whether the state has provided its students with such a sound basic education is a judgment question that must
be based not only on the available, but inherently limited, indicators of
student outcomes but also on an assessment of the appropriateness and effective use of the standards, resources, and other inputs into the system and
whether the systems in place are likely to prepare students to function productively in a modem, diverse society. (Rebell, pp. 37-38)
(Who could argue with that proposition, stated so vaguely?) Rather than
providing specifics as to the measures of success, Rebell instead makes the
case for a process orientation to these questions in which the judiciary
serves as the body that makes specific determinations regarding the legislature's pursuit of the abstract outcomes he identifies. (Perhaps this is why he
uses the gerund "Defining" in the title of the chapter, which suggests an ongoing process.) No doubt this is a productive proposal for approaching the
process of remedying educational failure and a process orientation is quite
comfortable territory for courts, but it does little to advance the specifics of
how we gauge success.
This round cannot be called. Depending upon one's views of the judiciary's role, its capacity to develop and implement remedial measures, and the
evidence of judicial efficacy, the authors present compelling cases to support
either side." What is most telling, however, is that neither book rejects judicial involvement wholesale. Rather, common ground might be found in
defining a narrow and effective role for courts to play.

44. The Supreme Court couldn't reach unanimity regarding these authors' works either. In
last term's Home v. Flores, a decision concerning the remedial order in a lawsuit brought against
Arizona under the federal Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Justice Alito's majority
opinion cited Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses approvingly and stated in dicta that
"[tihe weight of research suggests that these types of local reforms, much more than court-imposed
funding mandates, lead to improved educational opportunities." 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2604 & n.19
(2009). The majority also cited two other Hanushek works and stated that there is "a growing consensus in education research that increased funding alone does not improve student achievement,"
and "[elducation literature overwhelmingly supports reliance on accountability-based reforms as
opposed to pure increases in spending." Id. at 2603 & n.18. In response, Justice Breyer's dissent
cites Michael Rebell's Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of
the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1467, 1480 (2007), and states:
[The majority] does say, earlier in its opinion, that some believe that "increased funding alone
does not improve student achievement," and it refers to nine studies that suggest that increased
funding does not always help. I do not know what this has to do with the matter. But if it is relevant to today's decision, the Court should also refer to the many studies that cast doubt upon
the results of the studies it cites.
Home, 129 S. Ct. at 2628 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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B. The Role of Science in Decision Making

What level of scientific certainty is necessary for remedial educationalpolicy decision making? The answer to this question appears to drive much
of Hanushek and Lindseth's concern that courts and their typical remedies
of no-strings-attached additional funding or specific programmatic mandates
are not up to the task of fixing failing schools. Schoolhouses, Courthouses,
and Statehouses provides a thoroughgoing critique of the state of educational research and, more specifically, the so-called "costing out" or "cost"
studies that frequently are introduced in or ordered by school-financereform litigations. Put simply, Hanushek and Lindseth forcefully argue that
"[w]hile science is potentially a source of reliable, objective information
about programs and their expense, applying scientific methods to complex
educational and funding decisions is fraught with problems" (Hanushek &
Lindseth, p. 171). As a result, they are concerned that judges (and legislators!) presented with studies based on suspect methodologies, limited data,
and biased authors will make bad policy decisions.
Hanushek and Lindseth aim most of their punches at cost studies. 45
Those studies are frequently relied upon in crafting remedies in schoolfinance cases and are designed to systematically analyze the costs of the
resources that are needed to ensure the provision of an adequate education
or implement state standards effectively. Although Hanushek and Lindseth
identify four distinct methodologies employed in cost studies, the basic divide is between professional-judgment models and those that employ
statistical methodologies to estimate the costs of an adequate education.
"Professional judgment" studies convene panels comprised of educators,
administrators, and other experts to develop a basket of educational resources that would be necessary for a school or district to provide students
with an adequate education and then place a price tag on those resources.
Hanushek and Lindseth's primary objection to these studies is that they do
not consider the source of the revenues for their model schools and therefore
result in inefficiently high cost estimates (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 178).
Put simply, "[w]ith no incentive to be mindful of costs in coming up with
their model school, panel members tend to go on a shopping spree and order
everything their hearts desire" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 179). A variant, or
sometimes add-on, to the professional judgment approach is the evidencebased approach in which expert consultants identify specific research-based
programs and services for the model school that are necessary to achieve
adequacy. But that method similarly leads to inefficient cost estimates (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 186).

45. Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 173-200. Hanushek has critiqued cost studies elsewhere. See
Hanushek, supra note 15, at 257; Eric A. Hanushek, The Alchemy of "Costing Out" an Adequate
Education, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS, supra note 24, at 77. Rebell responds to many of those citiques and offers specific suggestions for improving cost studies in Michael A. Rebell, Professional
Rigor Public Engagement and JudicialReview: A Proposalfor Enhancing the Validity of Education
Adequacy Studies, 109 TCHRS. C. REc. 1303 (2006).
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The second broad type of cost study--composed of the successful
schools and cost function approaches-uses actual student achievement data
and educational expenditure data to estimate the costs of achieving proficiency on state standards, while adjusting for the additional costs of
educating children who either live in poverty or have language or special
education needs. While somewhat warmer toward these methods, Hanushek
and Lindseth argue that they too fail because of the inability to correlate
spending with outcomes and because the "black box" nature of the statistical analyses do not identify any set of policies, personnel
decisions, or the like, that contribute to success (Hanushek & Lindseth, pp.
191-92).
Beyond their critique of studies seeking to put a price tag on adequacy,
Hanushek and Lindseth argue that it is inappropriate to base policy decisions that would mandate the use of particular educational programs or
strategies on limited or unreliable research (Hanushek & Lindseth, pp.
200-11). Here they go after two of the sacred cows of educational-reform
advocates-class size reduction and preschool. While they do not argue that
these policies and programs are not helpful or essential, they do argue that
the limited research into their efficacy and the failure to have implemented
these strategies in an appropriate manner have created inefficiencies and
even adverse, unintended consequences. Again, Hanushek and Lindseth caution against the misuse of available scientific evidence in the policymaking
process.
Rebell, on the other hand, would not hold policymakers hostage to the
scientific certainty that Hanushek and Lindseth would demand (Rebell, pp.
64-67). While acknowledging the imperfections of cost studies, he nonetheless argues that courts and legislatures should look to those studies because
they are better than the alternative of doing nothing and maintaining the status quo of failure. Moreover, Rebell touts the transparency of the cost
studies' methodologies (a debatable proposition given the opacity of the
cost-function and successful schools approaches) and argues that the
courtroom crucible helps to ensure the integrity of these methods (Rebell,
pp. 66-67). With that latter point, Hanushek and Lindseth would disagree,
arguing that the legislative and judicial processes lack scientific checks and
balances. They would prefer that cost studies and other policy research be
subjected to "the continuing dialog within disciplines, the scientific peer
review system, and the mores of science work" (Hanushek & Lindseth, p.
212).
This dispute may be an irresolvable culture clash over the appropriate
choice of institutions. Rebell, a courtroom lawyer and advocate, is clearly
more comfortable with the hurly burly of the courtroom and the legislative
chamber and the outcomes of those processes. Indeed, his faith in the adversarial justice system makes him favor the policy "truth" that comes from
that process over others. Hanushek (and I say only Hanushek here, as
Lindseth is a lawyer) is a social scientist and is more comfortable with decision making based on the certainty that science demands. But even
Hanushek is pragmatic in the end. He recognizes that policymaking will be
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paralyzed if programmatic and funding decisions must await the final judgment of the peer review process. Instead, he proposes a performance-based
funding model that would reward good policy and programs and weed out
the poor performers and bad ideas.
III. ARGUING PAST EACH OTHER (OR, THE BOB AND WEAVE)

In the fifteenth round of this prizefight, the contenders' punches ultimately miss each other. Having made their case that additional funds alone
will not improve America's schools, Hanushek and Lindseth propose a
comprehensive and substantive overhaul of educational funding that includes interlocking components aimed at the singular goal of improving
student achievement, using economic incentives to get there (Hanushek &
Lindseth, Chapter Eight). Although they provide detailed and specific policy
proposals to accompany their performance-based funding model, Hanushek
and Lindseth identify seven principles of finance and policy reform, many of
which are explicitly supported by Rebell, including the establishment of
outcomes-based standards and accountability, funding policies that account
for student need, and new policies and programs that can be evaluated using
ongoing data collection (Hanushek & Lindseth, p. 218). No doubt the differences are in the details, but the broad strokes find some agreement.
Hanushek and Lindseth throw a substantive punch, while Rebell bobs
and weaves. He argues for no specific policy reforms. Instead, he proposes a
process through which the three branches of government work in collaboration to remedy educational failure by establishing the goals of the
educational system, adequate funding, and appropriate programs and accountability mechanisms that will be measured by student performance
(Rebell, Chapter Five). Pursuant to this vision, the legislature would be left
with the substantive task of establishing the goals, funding, and programs,
while the judiciary would oversee the performance of the legislature and
students over a period of time.
Hanushek and Lindseth duck this process punch, but they do recognize a
role for the courts. Although they are clearly wary of court intervention in
the form it has taken in the past-throwing money at the problem, in their
view-it is clear that they support many of the components of this process
and even call for courts to refocus themselves toward substantive school
reform (Hanushek & Lindseth, pp. 281-83). The question remains on the
extent to which they would allow the courts to participate in ensuring that
legislatures fulfill their roles both with regard to policy reforms and funding
adequacy.
IV. CAN WE REACH AGREEMENT ON THE WAY FORWARD?

(OR, CALLING IT A DRAW?)

In this championship brawl, there is a surprising amount of agreementagreement on the need for outcomes-based standards and accountability,
agreement on base-funding models that account for student needs, and
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agreement on the need to spend money wisely. Yes, there are real
disagreements on certain principles-whether the courts have a meaningful
and ongoing role to play and the usefulness of costs studies, for instance.
But it seems to me that what these fighters need is not a referee, but rather a
mediator.
To that end, I propose a resolution for bringing this fight to a conclusive
draw. If Michael Rebell can accept certain central tenets of the HanushekLindseth performance-based funding model (a working list might include
outcomes accountability, rewards for improved achievement, funding formulas that reduce "gaming," and data-based program evaluation); and if
Rick Hanushek and Al Lindseth can agree that a needs-based costing out of
the base education will occur simultaneously with other reforms, and that
the courts can supervise and hold the legislature accountable for reform and
outcomes where there is unassailable evidence of educational failure, would
the contenders agree to sit down and hash out this grand bargain in educational-finance-and-policy reform? Is there a chance that we can call this
fight a draw? To Mssrs. Rebell, Hanushek, and Lindseth: consider this an
open invitation from me to host this conversation at any time ... winners
take all.

